April 5, 2012 in politics,
About a year ago I correctly predicted the outcome of the “Arab Spring.” Pats on the back for me. Now the Syrian state is on the ropes, and we’re all wondering: when will it fall? We can use the same tools as earlier to answer that question. Also, I can use the word “whither” in a headline which, let’s face it, I never get to do. So, let’s get to it!
When the Arab Spring initially broke out, I predicted that Syria would fail to fall based upon strong group identification by its citizens as “Syrian”; the fairly recent record of military success in Lebanon; and the “liberalization” policies Bashar Assad[^1] put in place early in his regime. But it’s been a year, and it’s worth revisiting and seeing where we stand here.
Decision Chain
Our first stop is this (sadly low-quality scan, sorry!) diagram that looks at the overall process in an individual’s choice to join a revolution.
Walking through this in the context of Syria reveals changes in the last year. Of course, at the first level, citizens of Arab countries can now see truly how deprived they are, thanks to outlets like Al Jazeera that show them the opulence of the Gulf states and the everyday life of people elsewhere; but what’s changed is the context of joining in the revolution.
And the #1 Mistake Our Audience Voted That Dictators Make Is…
Especially in the wake of the Arab Spring — although, indeed, ever since his accession to power — Bashar Assad has pursued policies to “consolidate” his power[^2]. The problem with power consolidation in any political system is representativeness. A military dictatorship may not seem like a representative government, but the reality is that every government represents some group of people; it’s just that, with a democratic form of government, that group is much, much wider.
So dictatorships are never just arbitrary implementors of the will of one person without any regard to the needs of others; it’s simply that the dictator doesn’t have to feel the need to express will and desire in terms of society, broadly.[^3] However, in order to take power initially, the dictator does need a pretty large direct support base — enough to exert either military or moral force, or some combination of the two, in sufficient quantity to defeat opposition. That means that the initial policies of the dictator need to represent the will and desires of some good-sized chunk of society.
In Assad’s case, his father came to power with a core group of supporters from the same religion and region, but also broader support within the military and broad swaths of the Syrian power elite. When people talk of Bashar Assad “consolidating his power,” they always talk about how he’s increased the power of individuals who share his religion and region. But empowering one ingroup means creating a new outgroup, and, in this case, the new outgroup is made up of the former regime supporters who just didn’t match the right ethno-religious profile. That’s worth saying again: the regime has supposedly increased its power by shrinking the circle of individuals it represents and who can expect positive outcomes from that regime.
So are the new power centers more reliable and less likely to ever break with Assad? Sure. But the old groups who were marginally in power and now in the outgroup? They’re entirely sure to break with Assad, because the regime is no longer representative of their wills and desires. The return they might get on investing in the long-term stability of the Syrian government is sure to be zero.
Revolution or Not?
The next diagram looks at individual vs. group orientation and how the way groups express their perception of the world.
It’s interesting to think about this in the pre-Arab Spring context and in the current situation for the new outgroup member described above. Pre-Arab Spring, the group context was pan-Arab, and the injustice frame involved blaming Israel. Power Discontent was steered towards acts of terrorism against Israel, and occasional wars.
Now we clearly have groups within Syria that have been able to attract the affiliation of a wide variety of individuals, individuals who have taken up arms against the Syrian state. So, in this case, we can easily work backwards and see that these groups have been able to walk their members through each of the steps above. For the individuals “consolidated” out of power, we have a new injustice frame that never existed before; discontent with power that they couldn’t have had before because they had access to that power; and a collective orientation forced on the individual by the rationale behind power consolidation. (The only question is: where did these anti-regime groups come from in the first place?)
Violent or Not?
The flip side of the Pan-Arabist strategy pursued by Syria for so long is that they ensured that any discontent would go down the extrapunitive path. With power consolidation blocking all opportunities, a violent uprising is guaranteed.
In this case, Assad has decreased his options with his power consolidation — he’s removed his options to create open opportunities for individuals to effect change within society.
Now: will Syria fall?
This is the tough question. As we saw from Saddam Hussein-era Iraq, clearly a consolidated state can survive for years after it would appear to be ready to fall. In the case of Iraq, our aggressive sanctions probably paradoxically strengthened the group identification of Iraqis as Iraqis, which short-circuits the whole “group challenges legitimizing frame of status quo” thing.
So then the question is: will we do something like this for Syria? The good news is that, to the extent the Arab League takes the lead, all that work that the Syrian regime did to make Syrians identify with a pan-Arab community should prevent an Iraq-style regime hardening. If things really start looking up in Libya and Egypt, then broader swathes of the Syrian polity may start perceiving relative deprivation vis-a-vis other, similar Arabs.
But that’s a lot of ifs. On the flip side of all of those, Assad has the firepower to put down the rebels, and we probably can’t deliver enough counter-firepower to make a difference in any brief period of time, short of actual airstrikes. So time is against the groups rebelling against the regime. If Assad can beat these groups and then de-consolidate under the banner of complying with Arab League instructions — and the former certainly seems likely — then he has the opportunity to liberalize slightly and create a quasi-one-party democratic state, under the protection of the military; really, an Egypt-style outcome.
Ironic, huh?
[^1] Hey, compared to what was there before, “liberal” isn’t a hard moniker to earn.
[^2] In fact, for the first couple of years after he took over, I believe it was mandatory to mention power consolidation in every article about him.
[^3] Although one does see dictators, such as Pinochet in Chile or Franco in Spain, who have broad support and represent the will of some substantial plurality of the populace.
thedailywhat:
Infographic of the Day: Of course the MPAA doesn’t want people to see Bully. If people stopped turning a blind eye to bullying the MPAA could no longer exist.
[thanks jill!]
Also amen!
March 27, 2012
newsweek:
All of this focus on Trayvon Martin’s character after his getting suspended in high school—for an empty bag of weed, no less—is disconcerting. Anyone can get suspended for the silliest of offenses. Your tumblr was threatened with an in-school suspension in middle school for throwing a pencil…
Amen!
March 27, 2012
March 27, 2012 in politics,
The death of Trayvon Martin is probably one of those things that will be hashed and rehashed for generations. It’s sad all around, but one thing that’s not come up is that George Zimmerman went out with a tool that’s good for only one thing: killing someone:
Guns, Hey, Good God Y’all, What Are They Good For?
This isn’t your standard liberal “let’s take away all the guns!” post. I’m prepared to agree that the possession of a firearm has value as a political statement, and that, further, it’s important that we live in a world in which the government knows it’s dependent on the non-guaranteed assent of its citizens. (Although: good luck taking on the US military with your handgun!) Second Amendment? Whether it means we should have guns in the closet or a people in arms or just a shotgun here and there to protect against Indian raids, it’s an important part of our Constitution.
But there’s a difference between guns as a political statement and guns as something you carry around on a day-to-day basis. Face it: a gun has one mode of operation, and that’s to propel a small piece of metal into something at a very high rate of speed. There’s no stun mode, shoot-to-wound is only a myth, and the value of a gun as a threat only lies in its potential use to kill. So, when Zimmerman went out, he went out with a tool designed specifically and only to kill. He might not have planned to kill that day, but that strikes me more as a misunderstanding of the tool than anything else.
The Soft Bigotry of Not Packing
Now, Trayvon didn’t have a gun. Which apparently means that he wasn’t, in the legal sense, standing his ground: Zimmerman was. But a reasonable interpretation of events seems to me to be that Trayvon felt threatened, turned to confront his assailant — I presume that he had no legal requirement to avoid the conflict — and the two ended up in a physical altercation. Perhaps Trayvon went for Zimmerman’s gun and Zimmerman shot him. Apparently, because Zimmerman was packing, he was defending himself: Trayvon was the attacker.
This comes back to the issue of the purpose of a gun: in this altercation there was a tool that had no purpose but to kill. If Trayvon knew that there was a gun there, then he of course went for it, because he knew there could be no purpose to it but to kill him. If Trayvon went for the gun, Zimmerman had to shoot him, because there could be no purpose to Trayvon taking the weapon but to kill Zimmerman. Someone was ending up dead.
(Although I suppose there’s an argument for everyone having a gun in this conflict: perhaps if Trayvon had drawn down, there would’ve been a stand-off and the police would’ve arrived in time for everyone to live. Perhaps there’s an issue in the disparity of force that itself drove the situation.)
So Whose Fault Was It?
Being a good liberal, I probably sound like I’m blaming Zimmerman here; but really I’m not. It’s common to think that carrying a gun adds to security, but really all it does is give you a threat, and then one additional level of response that really you must use if you’re called on that threat. Most people don’t appreciate that part of the reality.
No, what I think we have here is a poor man — probably mentally ill, actually, based on the descriptions I’ve read of him — who tried to find some level of authority and meaning in that threat and promise of security that a gun can provide; and a second poor boy who perceived that threat and responded aggressively.
Why I Sympathize With Trayvon
Sure, I sympathize because I used to live in a bad neighborhood and I’d walk to the Jack in the Box at midnight wearing my USC hoodie. We all look scary in hoodies, I guess. But more than that I sympathize because I’ve been confronted with force before (although not a gun pointed at me) and I’ve responded with aggression myself, pretty consistently, and I can see myself attacking a guy with a gun who threatened me. I’d perceive that as my best self-defense, and I’m pretty sure that everyone reading this would, if I did defend myself this way, compliment me for having stood up to the other guy. I mean, it’s the modern ethos of self-reliance and self-defense, right?
So there’s the thing: if you pointed a gun at me, I’d try to take it away from you. (And I know how.) And then you’d have to shoot me, because otherwise I’d shoot you. That’s why I sympathize with Trayvon: he didn’t start the situation, but he responded the way I think I would have, and he paid with his life because someone else had chosen beforehand, for no good reason, to bring a tool to the tussle that required someone die once combat ensued.
So What’s the Solution?
To not carry a gun around, silly. I’m not saying don’t own a gun, just don’t carry it around unless you intend to shoot someone with it. That’s a simple rule, no? You can’t really threaten with a gun unless you intend to use it, and you shouldn’t intend to use it unless in self-defense, and almost nobody is going to walk down the street and be able to effectively use a firearm against an attacker. (That mugger will have a gun to your head before you can draw down.)
So don’t carry a gun. And, if for some reason you do, take responsibility for whatever it is you do with that gun. Make sure that shooting the person you shoot is important enough that the consequences are worth it.
March 21, 2012
Is that a casually-initiated tech project less than 100% done is most often much, much less than 0% done.
That chest of drawers you were half built? Useless, probabaly, but only an obstacle in the garage. The half-knit sweater? The dog dragged it out from under the chair and he loves it. Your novel you never got around to the second draft of? Just takes up a few bytes on your computer.
Almost done migrating your e-mail to a new host? Sorry, messages sent to you disappear into the aether until you flip that last switch. Most of the way through setting up an OpenID server? Can’t log into anything at all. A quarter of the way through migrating your blog to Wordpress? Well, have you clicked on the archive links to the right?
Oh technology, you’re such a tease!
March 20, 2012
I know the moment I shook off the stomach flu: 12:30am, Tuesday, March 20. That was when my eyes - eyes that had been sound asleep for more than two hours, now - popped open. And my brain said: “let’s get at it!”
We’d had big St. Patrick’s Day plans; that’s what happens when you marry an Irish woman. But I was excited about them: we were going fun places, eating delicious and indulgent food, and who cares if I’m not a beer guy? green makes everything funner!
But, oh, then my stomach. I won’t inflict the details upon you - by “you” I mean ” co-worker who’s only vaguely familiar with me but has tracked down this blog - but I’m sure you can project a story from your own experiences that was only somewhat worse and far, far funnier to you and your direct acquaintances.
Anyway, this stomach flu kept me napping all Sunday, and quiet all today, and I came home threatening early bedtimes until the realities of life - working late, feeding the dogs, keeping the parrot entertained, cultivating my Pinboard - intervened.
Ok, so I didn’t make it to bed by 9, but my eyes were closed by 10:30. So imagine my shock when I woke up at 12:30 and my brain said, clearly, to my disbelieving body: time to do all those things we planned to do this weekend.
At 1am? On a school night? Said my body, as it tried to roll over and go back to sleep.
Yes, said my brain, affecting a proper British headmaster’s accent, to get it’s point over.
And that’s why I’m up at 1:30 working on a writing project, of which this blog is only a side effect. But at least I know when I beat that darned flu!
March 15, 2012 in cooking,
So I usually think of myself as a good cook, but — I think I might’ve mentioned — I’m slow. Glacial. Weeknight meal? Sure, I’ll have that up for you in four hours, straight away.
Yeah, doesn’t work. So, I think I mentioned in my New Year’s Resolutions that I was going to take a cooking class. After a bunch of research I decided on a local school’s intro to cooking class.
Right. Intro. Time to suck up my pride. I learned back in tae kwon do that you only get to be fast by being perfect to start, so I figured, hey, let’s make unfounded generalizations. So far it’s been fun. I’ve been playing the role of super-nerd, asking every possible question (yes, it’s a role! don’t look at me like that!) and getting tons of perspective. And tons of chances to cut things up. And, best of all, tons of chances for the instructors to tell me what to do or not.
The first class was on salads. We paired up and my team ended up with the caesar salad. It was a little easier than I’d hoped but, hey, we took some care and it ended up real nice.
Today was harder: we made a red snapper green curry.
I was really excited for this week, because, despite all my foodie pretensions, I’m as scared of cooking fish as the next guy. I always choose slow, moist fish-cooking techniques that leave me with no risk of burning or sticking; but here I had to cook the snapper fast, over very high heat, to get nice browning. And, as the instructor said, “expect it to stick.”
Well, we got compliments on the doneness and texture of the fish. I have to say, it turned out everything I could hope. And everyone else deserved compliments too, with dishes like these:
And, best of all, my team finished quickly enough that we had time to practice various techniques and to just jaw a bunch. A little speed? Yes please!
February 26, 2012 in cooking,
We have this lemon tree in the backyard. Every year, it gave a bounty of lemons; we hardly had to buy a one at the market. Except for last year; last year, somehow it didn’t give us but one or two. It’s an old, dry tree, and we wondered if it was just getting ready to pass on. Well, it answered us this year: this year, it produced all last year’s lemons, all at once.
Confronted with all of these lemons, we’ve been cooking delicious marinated meats and lemony dressings, but it’s about to get out of hand. So I decided to go old school on it: I bought a bunch of canning jars and went to pickling.
First I harvested a big batch of orange-sized lemons. I cut off the stem end, cut them in quarters almost all the way through, and packed them with salt on the inside, in the Moroccan fashion.
Then I planned to stuff them in the jars; except these jars were sized for a lemon-sized lemon, not something that dwarfed our measuring spoons. So I quartered the lemons all the way through, packed in more salt, and added coriander seeds, cinnamon, and chills — all from Zanzibar!
Now it’s a few weeks before we know how things turn out, but I’m excited. Updates as acid- and salt-related cellular changes follow.
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